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1.  Introduction
Over the last two decades a growing concern over the phenomenon of the shadow
economy has increased attention among officials, politicians and social scientists.
For many countries there are several important reasons, why politicians should be
concerned about the size and growth of the shadow economy. Among the most
important of these are:
(1)  An increase in the size of the shadow economy is mainly caused by a rise in
the overall tax and social security payments burden, which may lead to an
erosion of the tax and social security bases and finally to a decrease in tax
receipts and thus to a further increase of the budget deficit or to further
increases of direct and / or indirect tax rates with the consequence of an
additional increase in the shadow economy, etc.
(2)  Under a growing shadow economy, (economic) policy is based on mistaken
„official“ indicators (like unemployment, official labor force, income,
consumption), it may to say the least, be wrong in magnitude. In such a
situation a prospering shadow economy may cause politicians severe
difficulties, because it „provides“ unreliable official indicators; the very
direction of intended policy measures may therefore be questionable.
(3)  The rise of the shadow economy can be seen as a reaction by individuals
being overburdened by state activities (such as high taxes and an increasing
number of regulations).
(4)  A growing shadow economy may have strong incentive effects to attract
workers (domestic and foreign) to work in the shadow economy and to work
less (efficiently) in the official economy.
These growing concerns have led many economists to the challenging and
difficult task to measure the size and development of the shadow economy, to18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 3
trace back the main causes of it and to analyze the interactions of the official and
unofficial economies. In section 2 the latest results of the size of the shadow
economies for 18 OECD-countries are shown. In section 3 the development of
the size of the shadow economy over time for Austria is presented and in section
4 the influence of a changing tax structure on the shadow economy is
investigated. Finally, section 5 summarizes the results of the size of the shadow
economy and gives some prospects for future research.
2.  Empirical results of the size of the shadow economy for OECD
countries
As has been shown in the literature 
1)  the currency demand approach 
2) is the most
often used method to estimate the shadow economy, it has been applied for most
OECD-countries. The results are shown in table 1.
Table 1
If one compares the results for the latest available year, 1998, it can be seen that
Greece (29,6 %), Italy (27.8 %), Spain (23.4 %), and Belgium (22.6 %) have the
largest shadow economies. In the mid-group are Sweden (20.0 %), Norway (19.7
%), Denmark (18.4 %), Ireland (16.9 %), Canada (15.0 %), France (14.9 %),
Germany (14.7 %) and The Netherlands (13.5 %), and at the lower end Austria
(9.1 %), USA (8.9 %) and Switzerland (8.0 %).
Moreover table 1 clearly shows, that the increase of the shadow economy over
time is quite remarkable and takes place in all investigated countries. Whereas in
                                               
1)  Compare e.g. Frey and Pommerehne (1984), Schneider (1994, 1997 and 1999) and Schneider and Enste
(2000).
2)  The currency demand approach is explained and criticized in section 3.18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 4
the year 1960 the size of the shadow economy was far below 5 % of GNP, the
shadow economy increased in the year 1998 in the countries Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom over 13 % of GNP
and in the remaining ones close to 10 %. If one considers the development of the
shadow economy over time for single countries, the size of the shadow economy
for Belgium was in the year 1970 10.4 % and has more than doubled up to the
year 1998 to 22.6 %. In the case of Italy the size of the shadow economy was in
the year 1970: 10.7 % and reached a size of 27.8 % in the year 1998 - an increase
of more than 160 % in 20 years. But also in countries, where the size of the
shadow economy is considerably smaller, the increase has been remarkably. If
one takes the case of the United States the shadow economy was in the year 1970
3.6 % and increased up to 8.9 % in the year 1998, an increase of 168 % ! Also
the shadow economy of the Netherlands increased from 4.8 % in the year 1970 to
13.5 % in the year 1998 - an increase for more than 181 %! These results
demonstrate that in the examined countries there is a strong increase of the
shadow economy over the years 1970 to 1998.
In table 2 it is tried to give one possible explanation of the different sizes of the
shadow economies of there OECD countries by comparing the overall tax and
social security contributions with the size of the shadow economy of the different
countries for the year 1996.
3)
Table 2
                                               
3)  In almost all studies the rise of the tax and social security contribution burdens is one of the most important
causes of the increase of the shadow economy. Compare for example Frey and Pommerehne (1984), Lipert
and Walker (1997), Schneider (1994a, 1994b, 1997, 1999), Thomas (1992, 1999), Tanzi (1999), Giles
(1999a) and Schneider and Enste (2000).18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 5
With the exception of Spain (shadow economy 22.9 %, tax and social security
burden 67.2 %), Greece, Italy, Belgium and Sweden, who have the largest
shadow economies in 1996 also have the highest tax and social security burden
(72.3, 72.9, 76.0 and 78.6%), whereas the countries like Switzerland and U.S.,
who have the lowest overall tax and social security burden (39.7 and 41.4%) they
have the lowest shadow economies with 7.5 and 8.8%, too! Of course, there are
exceptions, like  the United Kingdom and Austria with a quite high overall tax
and social security burden (54.9 and 70.4%) and a quite low shadow economy
(13.1 and 8.3%), but the overall pictures seems to fit, the higher the overall social
security and tax burden, the higher the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. The
strong positive relationship that arising tax and social security contribution
burdens cause a higher shadow economy, is also demonstrated in figures 2.1. and
2.2.
Figures 2.1. and 2.2
If one calculates the correlation coefficient between the tax and social security
contribution burden and the size of the shadow economy, the coefficient has a
value of 0.61, which is clearly statistically significant from zero. Also other
factors have an quite sizeable influence of the shadow economy, like the intensity
of regulations (especially labour market regulations), the welfare state and the
amount of public sector services.
4) Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón
(1998b) find overall significant and empirical evidence of the influence of
(labour) regulations on the shadow economy. In another paper of Johnson,
Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997), empirical evidence supports this finding, it
predicts, that countries with more general regulation of the economies tend to
have a higher share of the unofficial economy in total GDP; ceteris paribus, an
                                               
4)  Compare here especially the work of Johnson, Kaufmann and Schleifer (1997), Johnson, Kaufmann and
Zoido-Lobatón (1998) and Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1999).18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 6
one point increase of the regulation index (ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 = the most
regulation in a country) is associated with a 8.1 percentage point increase in the
share of the shadow economy. In their latest study Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann
and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) reach a similar result: an one point increase of the
regulation index (ranging from 1 to 5) is associated with a 10 percent increase in
the shadow economy of 76 developing, transition and developed countries.
After discussing the size and increase of the shadow economies in terms of value
added some first considerations about the shadow labor force are made. In table 3
estimates of the size of the shadow economy labor force in some OECD countries
over the period 1974-1998 are shown.
5)
Table 3
The figures provide a rough estimate about the size of the “shadow labor force”,
for example the results for Denmark indicate that the population engaged in the
shadow economy ranges from 8.3% (of the total labor force) in 1980 to 15.4% in
1994. In Germany this figure rose from 8% - 12% (1974-1982) to 22.0% (1997-
98). In other countries the “shadow economy labor force” is quite large,
too: in Italy between 30.0 and 48.0% (1997/1998), Sweden 19.8% (1997), France
6-12% (1997/1998). In the European Union at least 10 million people are
engaged in shadow economic activities and in all OECD countries about 16
million work black. These figures demonstrate that the shadow economy labor
                                               
5)  The “shadow economy labour force” can be calculated in two ways: 1. In surveys covering a whole country
people were asked about the amount of hours they work in the shadow economy. These figures are used to
calculate a total amount of hours work in the shadow economy in a country and from this figures “full time
shadow economy workers” can be claculated (in persons). Of course it is obvious that there actually exists
only a tiny fraction of full time shadow economy workers, the calculation is only done to give an overall
impression, how large the shadow economy labour force would be. The 2
nd method starts from the value
added estimates of the shadow economy, subtracts from these the value added of all material used in the
shadow economy. Making the assumption of an average shadow economy wage rate the amount of hours
worked in the shadow economy can be calculated again and from this figure the shadow economy labour
force (in persons).18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 7
market is lively and may provide an explanation, why, for example in Germany
one observes such a high and persistent unemployment in the “official labor”
market.
In order to study the increase of the shadow economy in more detail, in the next
section the development of the shadow economy over time for one country,
Austria, is investigated. Austria was chosen, because there is available data on
various kinds of direct and indirect tax burdens as well as data on the intensity of
regulation. For Austria it can additionally investigated, which of the major causes
(tax pressure, regulation, etc.) contributes most to the size of the shadow
economy.
3. Empirical results of the size of the Austrian shadow economy over
time
The method chosen for estimating the shadow economy in Austria over time is
the currency demand approach. This approach assumes that shadow (or hidden)
transactions are undertaken in the form of cash payments, so as to leave no
observable traces for the tax authorities. 
6)
An increase in the size of the shadow economy will therefore increase the
demand for currency. To isolate the resulting „excess“ demand for currency, an
equation for currency demand is econometrically estimated over time, with
controls for all possible conventional factors, such as the development of income,
payment habits, interest rates, and so on. Additionally, such variables like the tax
                                               
6)  The currency demand approach was first used by Cagan (1958), who calculated a correlation of the currency
demand and the tax pressure as one cause of the shadow economy for the United States for the period 1919
to 1955. 20 years later, Gutmann (1977) used the same approach, but did not use any statistical procedures;
instead he „only“ looked at the ratio between currency and demand deposits for the years 1937 to 1976.
Cagan’s approach was further developed by Tanzi (1980, 1983) who estimated a currency demand function
for the United States for the period 1929 to 1980 in order to measure the shadow economy.18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 8
burden and government regulations, which are assumed to be important major
factors that cause people to work in the shadow economy, are included in the
estimation equation. The „excess“ increase in currency, which is the amount
unexplained by the conventional or normal factors (mentioned above), is then
attributed to such variables as rising tax burden and regulations. Figures for the
size and development of the shadow economy can be calculated in a first step by
a comparison of the difference between the development of currency, when the
tax burden and government regulations are held at their lowest values, and the
development of currency with the current (much higher) burden of taxation and
government regulations. Assuming in a second step the same income velocity for
currency used in the shadow economy as for legal M1 in the official economy, the
size of the shadow economy can be computed and compared to the official GDP.
The currency demand approach is one of the most commonly used. Up to 1998 it
has been applied to 23 OECD-countries 
7), but has nevertheless been criticized on
various grounds. 
8) The most commonly raised objections to this method are
stated below: The first objection relates to the fact that not all transactions in the
shadow economy are paid in cash. Isachsen and Strom (1985) used the survey
method to discover that in Norway in 1980 roughly 80 % of all transactions in the
hidden sector were paid in cash. The size of the total shadow economy (including
barter) may thus be even larger than previously estimated. The second objection
is that most studies consider only one particular factor, the tax burden, as a cause
of the shadow economy. Other causes (such as the impact of regulation, the
complexity or visibility of the tax system, taxpayers’ attitudes to the state, „tax
morality“, and so on) are not considered because time series data of these
variables is not available for most countries. If, as seems likely, these other
                                               
7)   Compare, e.g., Boeschoten and Fase (1984), Schneider (1994, 1999) and Schneider and Enste (2000).
8)  See, e.g., Garcia (1978), Blades (1982), Frey and Pommerehne (1984), Klovland (1984), Kirchgässner
(1983, 1984), Weck (1983), Schneider (1986, 1994), Thomas (1986, 1992 and 1999) and Pozo (1996).18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 9
factors also have an impact on the extent of the hidden economy, it might be
larger than reported in most studies. 
9) A third objection against this approach at
least, when applied to the United States, is discussed by Garcia (1978) and Park
(1979). They point out that increases in the ratio of currency and demand deposits
are due largely to a slow-down in demand deposits rather than to an increase in
currency caused by activities in the shadow economy. A fourth objection is that
the U.S. dollar is used as an international currency, so that Tanzi should have
considered (and compensated for) the amount of U.S. dollars held in cash abroad.
Finally, Frey and Pommerehne (1984) claim that Tanzi’s parameter estimates are
not very stable. 
10) A fifth objection against this procedure, as applied in most
studies, is the assumption that the velocity of money in both types of economy is
the same. As Klovland (1984) argues for the Scandinavian countries, there is
already considerable uncertainty about the velocity of circulation of currency in
the official economy; the velocity of currency in the hidden sector is even more
difficult to estimate. Without knowledge about the velocity of currency in the
shadow economy, one has to accept the assumption of currency velocity in both
sectors to be the same. 
11) Finally, a sixth objection is that the assumption of no
shadow economy in a base year is open to criticism. Relaxing this assumption
would again imply an upward adjustment of the figures attained in the bulk of the
studies already undertaken.
Having just discussed its major weakness, the question may arise as to why I
have still chosen this approach. The answer is the following:
                                               
9)   One (weak) justification for the use of the tax variable only is that this variable has by far the strongest
impact on the size of the shadow economy in all studies known to the author. The only exception is the
study by Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984), in which the variable „tax immorality“ has a quantitatively
larger and statistically higher influence in the model than the direct tax share. In a study of the U.S. shadow
economy by Pommerehne and Schneider (1985), where data on various tax measures as well as on
regulation, tax immorality and minimum wage rates are available, the tax variable has a dominating
influence and contributes roughly 50 - 60 % to the size of the shadow economy.
10)  In studies for European countries, however, Kirchgässner (1983, 1984) and Schneider (1986) reach the
conclusion, that the estimation results for Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are quite robust, when
using this approach.
11)  Hill and Kabir (1996) and Giles (1999a, 1999b) undertake simulations varying the velocity of money and
found different sizes of the shadow economy for Canada.18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 10
(i)  Concerning the monetary sector there is reliable time-series data for Austria
for the period 1956 to 1998, and also time-series data for the different
measures of the tax burden, the complexity of the tax system and the intensity
of regulation, which are major causes of the shadow economy; and
(ii) the currency demand approach has been the most widely used so that
 comparisons to other countries can be made. In applying the currency
demand approach, I follow the procedure developed by Klovland (1984). His
basic model relates the stock of currency demanded by the public (outside
banks) to the price level, the volume of transactions in the regular economy
and the interest rate as a measure of the opportunity costs of holding
currency. 
12) I extend the procedure developed by Klovland by adding a close
substitute for cash money, the Eurocheque system (negative sign expected) 
13)
and by including more possible causes, why people might work in the shadow
economy.
As argued elsewhere, the following four types of causes for working in the
shadow economy are distinguished: 
14)
(i)  The burden of total direct taxation (DIRT), both average and marginal 
15)
with
DIRTt  =  TATRYt + AMTRYt, where
TATRYt  =  total average tax rate (including social security 
payments) on wage income in the year t and
                                               
12)  In order to avoid the difficult problem of money illusion, I deflated the dependent variable,
currencypercapita, and the independent variables, consumption and interest rates, with the GDP-deflator.
The interest rate on bonds prooved to be the best measure for the opportunity cost of holding currency. For
further empirical investigations using different deflators and different opportunity cost measures, see
Hofreither and Schneider (1987, 1989) and Schneider (1994).
13)   As a proxy for the total value of Eurocheques and Eurocheque-cards (as a substitute of money) in a year,
the number of valid Eurocheque-cards held by the public is used. However, since 9 years one can get
easily cash using the Eurocheque-card at an automatic money machine, so that the possibility to get cash
increased severely with the consequence that the negative expected sign may be questionable.
14)   Compare, for example, Pommerehne (1983, 1986), Hofreither and Schneider (1987), Neck, Schneider and
Hofreither (1989), Schneider (1994, 1999) and Tanzi (1999).18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 11
AMTRYt  =  average marginal tax rate on wage income in the year t.
A rising burden of direct taxation provides a strong incentive to work in the
shadow economy; positive sign expected.
(ii)  The burden of indirect taxation (INDT), which is defined as the percentage
ratio of the sum of all indirect taxes to gross domestic production net of
indirect taxes. Again a rising burden of indirect taxation provides a strong
incentive to work in the shadow economy; positive sign expected.
(iii)  The complexity of the tax system (COMTX) 
16), which following Wagner
(1976) and Clotefelter (1976, 1983), is defined with the help of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration measure:











REVit  equals the i-th revenue share of the total revenue amount for all m
revenue items in a year t;
EXEMjt equals the j-th tax exemption of the total tax exemptions n in a year
t, which refer to direct and indirect taxes and for statistical reasons
REV and EXEM are combined into one variable.
Thus COMTX is equal to 2 if only one revenue source exists in a year t and
if there are no tax exemptions. In this case, the tax system is highly simple
and every change will be immediately recognized by the taxpayer, e.g., an
increase in the tax burden will immediately lead to more shadow economy
activities. As the number of revenue sources and tax exemptions increases,
the tax system becomes more and more complex. In this case, a tax increase
                                                                                                                                                  
15)   Most studies stress that both average and marginal tax rates induce people to work in the shadow
economy; compare the references in Schneider (1994).
16) For a theoretical underpinning why this variable is included, compare Neck and Schneider (1993), where
a simple theoretical microeconomic model of household behavior is formulated where the household can
participate in the official and shadow economy. Using comparative statistics, Neck and Schneider show18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 12
is much less recognizable („felt“ much less) by the taxpayer and hence leads
to a lower increase in shadow economy activities than under an extremely
simple tax system. 
17)  Moreover, the more "legal" tax loopwholes and tax
exemptions are created the lower is the incentive to work in the shadow
economy (ceteris paribus); positive sign expected.
(iv)  The intensity of regulations (REG), as proxy for all state regulatory
activities, which is defined a the stock of all existing and enforced laws
concerning federal, state and local regulatory activities. 
18) It is assumed,
too, that increases in the burden of regulation provide a strong incentive to
work in the shadow economy; positive sign expected.
The estimation results of the currency demand functions are shown in table 4.
Table 4
All coefficients of independent variables have the theoretically expected signs,
are statistically significant at the 95 % confidence level. Also the other test-
statistics show satisfactory results; especially the „true“ ex-post forecast for the
period 1990 to 1998 indicates that the major independent factors in the currency
demand function are included. 
19)
As in most studies for Austria’s neighboring countries as well as for the
Scandinavian countries it is assumed, that there would have been no shadow
                                                                                                                                                  
that the complexity of the tax system affects participation in the shadow economy negatively, i.e. a more
"complex" tax system implies, ceteris paribus, a smaller labor supply in the shadow economy.
17)   There is an extensive literature on this type of „fiscal illusion“, compare, e. g. Pommerehne (1983, 1986).
18)   Regulatory activities are here defined in the areas of foreign labor, social security, working hours and
other working conditions. The author is aware that this is an extremely crude measure, which is open to
severe criticism, but I do not know any better measure, which is available on a time series basis.
19)   Some further results (e.g., transforming the dependent variable into first differences) are available from
the author upon request. The log transformation of the dependent and independent variables seems to be
the best functional form.18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 13
economy if the direct and indirect tax burdens and the amount of regulation had
remained at their historical minimum from 1956 until 1998. Keeping these
variables at their minimum level in the year 1956, the „normal“ (without shadow
economy) level of currency holdings is calculated by undertaking a dynamic
simulation. The difference between the actually observed and the simulated
currency holdings is assumed to reflect the amount of currency used for shadow
economy transactions. Assuming the same velocity for currency used in the
shadow economy as for legal M1 in the official economy, the size of the shadow
economy is computed and compared to the official GDP. 
20) Table 5 shows the
results for the absolute values and the growth of the Austrian shadow economy
from 1965 to 1998. The Austrian shadow economy increased more or less
steadily and reached a peak value in 1998 with 9.12 percent of official GDP. The
conclusion by Franz (1985) and Mooslechner (1985) that the shadow
economy did not grow from 1976 to 1982 is not supported by these findings. 
21)
4 The influence of changing tax structures on the Austrian shadow
economy
Table 5 indicates that the Austrian shadow economy has more or less grown
steadily in the course of time.
Table 5
This is surprising as there had been major changes of the direct and indirect tax
rates and of tax structures during the period 1965 to 1998. In the following, it is
                                               
20)   Because of a complete lack of knowledge about the velocity of money in the shadow economy, this
assumption is made here as in most other studies using this approach (e.g., Tanzi, 1980, 1983;
Kirchgässner, 1983, 1984; Iachsen and Strom, 1985; Schneider, 1986, 1994) However, the calculation of
the shadow economy using different velocities of money is quite sensitive compare the latest work by Hill
and Kabir (1996) and Giles (1999a, 1999b) for Canada.
21)   Due to the different specification and the inclusion of the additional independent variables as causes for
working in the shadow economy, the results in table 3 differ from the results in Hofreither and Schneider
(1987, 1989) and Schneider, Hofreither and Neck (1989).18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 14
investigated what influences had the effects of these tax changes on the
development of the shadow economy and test the hypothesis on the complexity of
the tax system, considering three cases
22):
(i) 1972/73
- the introduction of the value-added tax, a rate of 16 % (1.1.1973),
- switch from family (joint) to individual income taxation, and
- additional tax exemptions to stimulate investment and accumulation
of capital.
(ii) 1983/84
- increase of most indirect tax rates (e.g., value-added tax from 18 to
20 %, value-added tax on luxury goods from 30 to 32 %, etc.),
- new tax on interest rates, and
  - tax exemptions to stimulate venture capital.
(iii) 1988/89 (major income tax reform)
- considerable reduction of all marginal tax rates on income, e.g., from
62 to 50 % (top marginal tax rate),
- reduction of the number of income-tax rates from 10 to 5, and
- decrease in the average tax rates on capital gains and profits and
simplification of the system.
The influence of these three major tax changes on the development of the shadow
economy is shown in Table 6.
23)
                                               
22) In the following, only the most important tax rate and structure changes are discussed; for detailed
information, see Bös (1975), Genser and Holzmann (1987, 1990).
23) The influences of the tax changes (i) to (iii) are reflected in changes of the yearly values of the three
independent tax variables DIRT, IND and COMTX. The calculations in table 6 are done using the
estimated coefficients and the values of the independent variables to calculate the values they contribute to
the shadow economy of the year of the tax reform t and of the year t+1.18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 15
Table 6
If one first considers case (i), the changes in direct taxation (e.g., switch from
family to individual taxation) had the strongest effect on the shadow economy (42
% of the increase of the shadow economy were caused by these changes). The
introduction of the highly simple value-added tax (compared to the old turnover
tax) had a stronger effect on the reduced complexity than on the rise in the
indirect tax burden. Switching to case (ii), the "cold progression effect" of income
taxation dominated the increase in the rates of a number of indirect taxes.
Whereas the first was responsible for 58.4% of the increase of the shadow
economy, raised indirect taxes contributed only 40.5%. However, most
interesting is case (iii), the major tax reform in 1989. Ceteris paribus, the
considerable reduction in the direct marginal and average tax burden would have
decreased the shadow economy by 1.15 Bill.AS (a reduction of 2.5% of the
shadow economy of 46.37 Bill.AS in 1988). However, the negative effect of the
decreased personal income tax rates on the shadow economy is more than
offset by the strongly reduced complexity of the tax system. Also the increased
regulation intensity compensates the negative effect of the reduced income tax
rates as well.
Table 7 shows the break down of the four causes in percent responsible for the
size and growth of the shadow economy.
24)
Table 7
                                               
24) The calculations of the relative influencies of the four causes, which contribute to the Austrian shadow
economy, are done in the following way: The total influence of the four independent variables DIRT, IND,
COMTX and REG are calculated for every year in total and this sum is normalized to 100. Then the
relative weights (adding up to 100) of the independent variables are calculated for each year. 100.18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 16
If one first considers the direct tax burden, it has by far the biggest influence of
the whole period; however, it is a strongly declining one: up to the year 1977
roughly 50% of all shadow economy activities were caused by the burden of
direct taxation, but in the year 1995 this impact hat diminished to 29%. Since
then, however, if increased again to 29.5% (year 1998) due to the necessety to
fullfill the Maastricht-criteria, the Austrian government increased direct tax rates.
The opposite trend holds for the influence of the indirect tax burden. Whereas in
the sixties "only" 12% of shadow economy activities were caused by this factor,
in the years 1997 and 1998 the influence had risen to 26.7% and 26.8,
respectively. The influence of the complexity of the tax system on the shadow
economy also declined compared with the seventies; in the sixties we had quite a
simple tax system causing 25% of all shadow economy activities. This influence
diminished to 17.7% in 1997-98. On the other hand, we can observe a strong
increase in the percentage share of the shadow economy due to the intensity of
regulation. In the sixties and seventies this factor caused "only" 10-12% of all
shadow economy activities, but increased to 26.0-26.3% in the years 1997 and
1998.
These findings confirm the theoretically derived hypothesis about the influence of
the complexity on the shadow economy: The decline of the direct tax burden in
1989 had a negative effect on the size of the shadow economy, but it had been
offset by a decrease in complexity of the tax system and an increase in regulations
(especially in the labor market).
5. Summary and future research areas
If one wants to calculate the size of the shadow economy, one realizes that there
are many obstacles to be overcome to measure its size and to analyze the18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 17
consequences on the official economy, but some progress has been made. In this
paper it has been shown that, though it is difficult to estimate the size of the
shadow economy, it is not impossible. I have demonstrated that with the currency
demand approach some insights can be provided about the size and development
of the shadow economy of the OECD-countries. The general impression from the
results of the two methods is that the shadow economy is sizable. For 15 of the
18 investigated OECD-countries the estimate of the studies shown in table 1 for
the year 1998, demonstrate that its size is more than 13 % of GNP. As it has
already been argued, there is no „best“ or commonly accepted method; each
approach has its specific strengths and weaknesses and each specific insights and
results. Although the different methods provide a rather wide range of estimates,
there is general agreement that the size of the shadow economics for the OECD-
countries has been strongly growing over the recent decades. This has been
especially demonstrated for Austria, where the shadow economy increased from
12,02 (1.73 % official GNP) billion Austrian shillings in the year 1975 to 123,62
(9.12 % of official GNP) billion shillings in the year 1998.
The next step is to analyze in much greater detail the effects of changing policy
means on the development of the shadow economy. When the government
changes the tax structure like a decrease of direct tax burden one would expect
that the shadow economy would decrease. However, I observed in the period
from 1989 to 1998 that even, when a major tax reform with significant lower tax
rates had been undertaken, the shadow economy is still increasing, because other
important factors, why people work in the shadow economy, like regulation, have
increased during this time.  Hence, the effect of a lower direct tax burden was
more than offset by the increased regulation.
In general these results should be seen as a first step to study the interactions
between the official and the shadow economy. In the next steps it should be18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 18
worked out in a much more precise way how the shadow economy is also
influenced by non-economic influences (like the tax morale and peoples’ attitude
towards the state) and what consequences these influences have on the official
economy.18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 19
Table 1: The Development of the Size of the Shadow Economy in Selected OECD Countries Over Time Applying the
Currency Demand Approach
Size of the Shadow Economy (in % of official GDP)
Using the Currency Demand Approach in the Year OECD-Countries
1960 1970 1980 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Australia - - - 13.0 13.2 14.0 13.9 14.1
Austria 0.4 1.8 3.0 6.7 7.3 8.3 8.9 9.1
Belgium - 10.4 16.4 21.4 21.6 21.9 22.4 22.6
Canada - - 10.1-11.2 14.6 15.0 15.1 14.8 15.0
Denmark 3.8-4.8 5.3-7.4 6.9-10.2 17.6 18.1 18.3 18.1 18.4
France - 3.9 6.9 14.3 14.8 14.9 14.7 14.9
Germany 2.0-2.1 2.7-3.0 10.3-11.2 13.1 13.9 14.5 15.0 14.7
Greece - - - 26.0 26.6 28.5 28.7 29.0
Ireland - 4.3 8.0 15.3 15.6 15.9 16.1 16.3
Italy - 10.7 16.7 25.8 26.2 27.0 27.3 27.8
Netherlands - 4.8 9.1 13.6 14.1 14.0 13.5 13.5
New Zealand
1) - 6.9 9.2 11.3 - - - -
Norway 1.3-1.7 6.2-6.9 10.2-10.9 17.9 18.5 18.9 19.4 19.7
Spain - 10.3 17.2 22.3 22.6 22.9 23.1 23.4
Sweden 1.5-1.8 6.8-7.8 11.9-12.4 18.3 18.9 19.2 19.8 20.0
Switzerland 1.2 4.1 6.5 6.6 6.9 7.5 8.1 8.0
United Kingdom - 2.0 8.4 12.4 12.6 13.1 13.0 13.0
USA 2.1-4.1 2.6-4.6 3.9-6.1 9.4 9.0 8.8 8.8 8.9
Source: Schneider (1997, 1999).
1) Source: Giles (1999b).18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 20














































1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Greece 28.5 18.0 11.0 15.8 27.5 43.3 54.3 72.3
Italy 27.0 19.0 12.0 9.9 32.0 41.9 53.9 72.9
Spain 22.9 16.0 13.0 6.6 31.6 38.2 51.2 67.2
Belgium 21.9 21.0 19.0 10.0 26.0 36.0 55.0 76.0
Sweden 19.2 25.0 20.0 4.0 29.6 33.6 53.6 78.6
Norway 18.9 23.0 19.0 7.0 12.8 19.8 38.8 61.8
Denmark 18.3 25.0 36.0 9.0 0.0 9.0 45.0 70.0
Ireland 15.9 21.0 20.0 7.2 12.3 19.5 39.5 60.5
Canada 14.6 7.0 21.0 7.0 8.0 15.0 36.0 43.0
Germany 14.5 15.0 18.0 16.1 16.1 32.2 50.2 65.2
France 14.3 20.6 6.0 13.0 31.0 44.0 50.0 70.6
Netherlands 14.0 17.5 10.0 31.0 8.8 39.8 49.8 67.3
U.K. 13.1 17.5 16.0 10.7 10.2 21.4 37.4 54.9
USA 8.8 3.0 17.0 7.6 13.8 21.4 38.4 41.4
Austria 8.3 20.0 8.0 18.2 24.2 42.4 50.4 70.4
Switzerland 7.5 6.5 10.0 11.6 11.6 23.2 33.2 39.7
1) Rates of the year 1996; USA: Average sales tax
2) Average direct tax rate is calculated as the sum of all income taxes (+ payroll and manpower taxes) paid on wages and salaries (including income of self-
employed) divided by gross labor costs of an average income earner.
3) The rate is calculated on the basis of the annual gross earnings of an average income earner.
Source: Own calculations and OECD-working paper 176, 1997.18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 21
Figure 2.1: Size of the Shadow Economy vs Total Soc. Security 
Contributions + Direct Tax Burden*, Year 1996
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Figure 2.2: Size of the Shadow Economy vs 
Total Tax* and Soc. Security Burden, Year 1996 
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Table 3: Estimates of the Size of the “Shadow Economy Labor
Force” in Some OECD Countries 1974-1998





















Denmark 1980 - 8.3 8.6
1986 - 13.0 -
1991 - 14.3 11.2





















































1) Estimated full-time jobs, including unregistered workers, illegal immigrants, and second jobs.
The estimations are based either on surveys (e.g. Denmark) or on a calculation using the value-
added values of the shadow economy (subtracting all material inputs) and assuming certain average
values of earnings paid per hour in the shadow economy.
2) In percent of the population aged 20-69. In Denmark: In percent of the population aged 20-69,
survey method (% heavily engaged in shadow economy activities).
Source: Schneider and Enste (2000).18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 24
Table 4: Estimation Results of the Currency Demand Function for Austria*)
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable: Real Currency
per Capita,  ln (CURt/POPt)
Estimation Period
1956 - 1998 1956 - 1990
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.641 ** 0.673 **
ln (CUR t-1 / POP t-1) (10.93) (11.87)
Real Consumption per capita 0.734 ** 0.749 **
ln (C t / POP t) (6.53) (6.09)
Number of Eurocheque Systems per capita - 0.175 ** - 0.204 *
ln (ES t-1 / POP t-1) (- 2.29) (- 2.39)
Real Interest Rate on Bonds - 0.113 * - 0.122 *
ln (IR t) (- 2.31) (- 2.55)
Direct Tax Burden (including social security





Indirect Tax Burden 0.129 * 0.119 *
ln (INDT t) (2.28) (2.02)
Complexity/”Visibility” of the Tax System 0.124 * 0.119 **
ln (COMTX t) (2.49) (2.71)
Intensity of Regulation 0.203 ** 0.189 **
ln (REG t) (3.36) (2.92)








Durbin’s h 1.07 1.18
rho (1) 0.21 0.23
D.F. 35 27
Ex-post Forecast 1990 - 1998
RMSE - 1.39
Theil’s U 1 - 0.39
*)  All equations are estimated by an ordinary least-squares procedure using annual data. R
2 is the adjusted
coefficient of determination (corrected for the degrees of freedom); S.E. shows the standard error of the
estimation. Durbin’s h is Durbin’s h-test against autocorrelation, when a lagged dependent variables used as
regressor. Rho (1) is the autocorrelation coefficient of first order. D.F. stands for the degrees of freedom.
RMSE is the root mean squared error and Theil’s U 1 stands for Theil’s inequality coefficient. The term
„ln“ indicates that these variables have been transformed to natural logarithms. Numbers in parentheses
below coefficient estimates are t-values. (*), * and ** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99%-level,
respectively. Real Currency is defined as cash money held outside banks.18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 25





Value Added in the
Shadow Economy,
real, Bill AS
Size of the Shadow
Economy in percent
of the „official“ GDP
1965 440.95 5.14 1.16
1966 466.20 5.69 1.22
1967 479.98 5.49 1.14
1968 502.18 6.21 1.24
1969 533.44 8.31 1.56
1970 571.25 10.47 1.83
1971 600.31 9.58 1.59
1972 637.69 10.41 1.63
1973 669.29 13.34 1.99
1974 695.79 12.46 1.79
1975 692.84 12.02 1.73
1976 724.75 15.39 2.12
1977 756.12 18.01 2.38
1978 760.23 20.06 2.63
1979 795.96 22.88 2.87
1980 820.03 24.98 3.05
1981 818.58 26.96 3.29
1982 828.62 29.09 3.51
1983 845.54 31.86 3.77
1984 862.66 36.38 4.22
1985 887.39 36.98 4.16
1986 904.46 39.64 4.38
1987 924.84 41.22 4.46
1988 959.91 46.37 4.83
1989 1004.09 50.89 5.07
1990 1061.32 54.56 5.14
1991 1126.32 59.89 5.32
1992 1160.37 68.23 5.88
1993 1181.90 74.46 6.30
1994 1228.95 82.34 6.70
1995 1243.89 89.56 7.20
1996 1273.98 105.86 8.31
1997 1303.99 116.32 8.92
1998 1355.50 123.62 9.12
1) Assumptions made for the calculation of the shadow economy:
(i) All transactions in the shadow economy are made in cash. (ii) Direct and indirect tax burdens, the
complexity of the tax system and the intensity of regulations are the reasons for working in the shadow
economy. (iii) In 1960 the shadow economy did not exist. (iv) The velocity of currency is the same in the
shadow economy as in the official economy and is calculated by dividing total income by M1. (v) For the
calculation, first the currency-demand equation from table 4 is used.18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 26
Table 6:  The Influence of Changing Tax Systems on the Size and Growth of
the Austrian Shadow Economy
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Table 7: Breakdown of the Shadow Economy According to the Four Causes













1965 51.2 12.1 25.9 9.8
1966 51.8 12.4 25.3 11.1
1967 49.3 11.2 26.1 13.4
1968 49.6 11.9 25.3 13.2
1969 50.9 12.6 24.6 11.9
1970 51.3 13.5 23.4 11.8
1971 52.3 13.3 23.0 11.4
1972 53.6 13.9 22.8 9.7
1973 51.1 16.5 24.3 8.1
1974 52.0 16.0 24.0 8.0
1975 50.9 15.9 23.4 9.8
1976 51.4 18.4 21.2 9.0
1977 51.0 20.1 20.6 8.3
1978 49.6 22.0 18.7 9.7
1979 47.6 21.9 18.8 11.7
1980 46.3 21.6 17.9 14.2
1981 45.0 23.3 17.0 14.4
1982 42.2 24.9 17.1 15.8
1983 42.3 24.3 16.3 17.1
1984 44.3 26.3 14.2 15.2
1985 44.0 25.2 15.2 15.6
1986 43.1 25.2 14.1 17.6
1987 40.9 24.0 13.7 21.4
1988 41.0 24.3 13.2 21.5
1989 35.1 25.6 17.1 22.2
1990 34.6 25.1 17.3 23.0
1991 34.1 25.4 17.0 23.5
1992 33.1 25.6 17.4 23.9
1993 31.9 25.9 17.9 24.3
1994 30.5 26.2 18.2 25.1
1995 28.7 26.6 18.7 26.0
1996 29.1 26.6 18.2 26.1
1997 29.3 26.7 17.7 26.3
1998 29.5 26.8 17.7 26.018.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 28
4. References
Alm, J., 1988, Compliance Costs and the Tax Avoidance Tax Evasion Decision,
Public Finance Quarterly, 16, pp. 31 - 66.
Blades, D., 1982, The Hidden Economy and the National Accounts, OECD
Economic Outlook, Paris, pp. 28 - 45.
Bös, D., 1975, Die finanzpolitische Entwicklung in Österreich 1971-1974,
Finanzarchiv, N.F. 33, pp. 305-338.
Boeschoten, W. C., and M. M. G. Fase, 1984, The Volume of Payments and
the Informal Economy in the Netherlands 1965 - 1982, Dordrecht:
Kluwer-Publishing Comany.
Cagan, P., 1958, The Demand for Currency Relative to the Total Money Supply,
Journal of Political Economy, 66, pp. 303 - 328.
Clotefelter, C. T. C., 1976, Public Spending for Higher Education: An Empirical
Test of Two Hypotheses, Public Finance, 31, pp. 177 - 195.
Clotefelter, C. T. C., 1983, Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of
Individual Returns, Review of Economics and Statistics, 65, pp. 363 -
373.
Franz, A., 1985, Estimates of the Hidden Economy in Austria on the Basis of
Official Statistics, Review of Income and Wealth, 31, pp. 325 - 336.
Frey, B. S., and W. W. Pommerehne, 1984, The Hidden Economy: State and
Prospects for Measurement, Review of Income and Wealth, 30, pp. 1 -
23.
Frey, B. S., and H. Weck-Hannemann, 1984, The Hidden Economy as an
„Unobserved“ Variable, European Economic Review, 26/1, pp. 33 - 53.
Friedman, E., Johnson, F. Kaufmann, D. and Zoido-Lobatón P. (1999), Dodging
the Grabbing Hand: The Determinance of Unofficial Activity in 69
countries, Discussionpaper, Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Garcia, G., 1978, The Currency Ratio and the Suberranean Economy, Financial
Analysis Journal, 34 (6), pp. 64 - 66.
Genser, B., and R. Holzmann, 1987, Die finanzpolitische Entwicklung in
Österreich 1985 - 1986, Finanzarchiv, N. F. 45, pp. 500 - 526.
Genser, B., and R. Holzmann, 1990, Die finanzpolitische Entwicklung in
Österreich 1987 - 1988, Finanzarchiv, N. F. 48, pp. 143 - 168.
Giles, D., E.A. (1999a): Measuring the hidden economy: Implications for
econometric modelling, The Economic Journal, 109/456, pp.370-380.
Giles, D., E.A. (1999b): Modelling the hidden economy in the tax cape in New
Zealand, Working paper, Department of Economics, University of
Victoria, Canada
Gutmann, P. M., 1977, The Subterranean Economy, Financial Analysis Journal,
33 (6), pp. 26 - 27, 34.
Hill, R. and M. Kabir (1996): Tax rates, the tax mix, and the growth of the
underground economy in Canada: What can we infer?, Canadian Tax
Journal/Revue Fiscale Canadienne 44/6, pp.1552-1583.18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 29
Hofreither, M. F., and F. Schneider, 1987, Die Erfassung der Schattenwirtschaft
durch den Bargeldansatz - plausible Ergebnisse mittels unzulässiger
Methode?, Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter, 34, pp. 99 - 118.
Hofreither, M. F., and F. Schneider, 1989, Gibt es ein politisches Interesse die
Schattenwirtschaft zu bekämpfen? Ein Versuch politisch-ökonomischer
Erklärung, in: E. Boettcher, P. Herder-Dornreich, and K. E. Schenk
(eds.), Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, 8, Tübingen, pp. 62 -
87.
Isachsen, A., and S. Strom, 1980, The Hidden Economy: The Labor Market and
Tax Evasion, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 82, pp. 304 - 311.
Isachsen, A., and S. Strom, 1985, The Size and Growth of the Hidden Economy
in Norway, Review of Income and Wealth, 31, pp. 21 - 38.
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D. and Shleifer, A. (1997), The Unofficial Economy in
Transition, Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, Fall, Washington
D.C.
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D. and Zoido-Lobatón P. (1998), Regulatory Discretion
and the Unofficial Economy, The American Economic Review, 88/2,
pp. 387 - 392.
Kirchgässner, G., 1983, Size and Development of the West-German Shadow
Economy 1955 - 1980, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft,
139, pp. 197 - 214.
Kirchgässner, G., 1984, Verfahren zur Erfassung des in der Schattenwirtschaft
erarbeiteten Sozialproduktes, Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, 68, pp.
378 - 405.
Klovland, J., 1984, Tax Evasion and the Demand for Currency in Norway and
Sweden. Is there a Hidden Relationship?, Scandinavian Journal of
Economics, 86, pp. 423 - 439.
Lipert, O. and Walker, M. (eds.) (1997), The Underground Economy: Global
Evidence of Size and Impact, Vancouver, The Fraser Institute.
Mooslechner, P., 1985, Der monetäre Ansatz zur Schattenwirtschaft - Eine
empirische Illustration anhand österreichischer Daten, in: J. Skolka (ed.),
Die andere Wirtschaft: Schwarzarbeit und Do-It-Yourself in
Österreich, Vienna, pp. 101 - 119.
Neck, R. and F. Schneider, 1993, The Development of the Shadow Economy
Under Changing Tax Systems and Structures, Finanzarchiv, 50/3, pp.
344 - 369.
Neck, R., F. Schneider and M. F. Hofreither, 1989, The Consequences of
Progressive Income Taxation for the Shadow Economy: Some Theoretical
Considerations, in: D. Bös and B. Felderer (eds.), The Political
Economy of Progressive Taxation, Heidelber, pp. 149 - 176.
OECD, 1997, Taxation and Economic Performance, by Leebtritz, W,, Thornton,
J. and Bibbee, A., Economics Department, Working Paper 176, Paris,
1997.
Park, T., 1979, Reconciliation between Personal Income and Taxable Income,
1947 - 1977, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Washington, D. C.18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 30
Pommerehne, W. W., 1983, Steuerhinterziehung und Schwarzarbeit als Grenzen
der Staatstätigkeit, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und
Statistik, 119, pp. 261 - 284.
Pommerehne, W. W., 1986, Was wissen wir eigentlich über
Steuerhinterziehung?, Rivista Internazionale di Science Economiche e
Commerciali, 35, pp. 230 - 262.
Pommerehne, W. W., and F. Schneider, 1985, The Decline of Productivity
Growth and the Rise of the Shadow Economy in the U.S.; Working
Paper, University of Aarhus.
Pozo, Susan (ed.), 1996, Exploring the underground economy: Studies of
illegal and unreported activity, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn, Institute for
Employment Research.
Schneider, F., 1986, Estimating the Size of the Danish Shadow Economy Using
the Currency Demand Approach: An Attempt, Scandinavian Journal of
Economics, 88, pp. 643 - 668.
Schneider, F., 1994, Determinanten der Steuerhinterziehung der Schwarzarbeit im
internationalen Vergleich, in: Smekal, Ch. und Theurl, E. (eds.), Stand
und Entwicklung der Finanzpsychologie, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag,
pp. 247 - 288.
Schneider, F., 1997, The Shadow Economies of Western Europe, Journal of The
Institut of Economic Affairs, 17/3,  pp. 42 – 48
Schneider, F., 1999, Ist Schwarzarbeit ein Volkssport geworden? Ein
internationaler Vergleich des Ausmaßes der Schwarzarbeit von 1970-97,
in: Lamnek, S. and Luedtke, J. (eds.), Der Sozialstaat zwischen Markt
und Hedonismus, Obladen (West Germany): Luedtke and Budrich
publishing company, pp.293-318.
Schneider, F., M. F. Hofreither and R. Neck, 1989, The Consequences of a
Changing Shadow Economy for the ‘Official’ Economy: Some Empirical
Results for Austria, in: D. Bös and B. Felderer (eds.), The Political
Economy of Progressive Taxation, Heidelberg, Springer Publishing
Company, pp. 181 - 211.
Schneider, F. and Enste, D., 2000, Shadow Economies Around the World: Sizes,
Causes and Consequences, forthcoming in The Journal of Economic
Literature, March 2000.
Tanzi, V., 1980, The Underground Economy in the United States: Estimates and
Implications, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly, 135, pp. 427 -
453.
Tanzi, V., 1983, The Underground Economy in the United States: Annual
Estimates, 1930 - 1980, IMF-Staff Papers, 30, pp. 238 - 305.
Tanzi, V., 1999, Uses and Abuses of Estimates of the Underground Economy,
The Economic Journal 109/456, pp.338-340.
Thomas, J.J., 1986, The underground economy in the United States: A comment
on Tanzi, IMF-Staff Papers Vol.33, No. 4, pp.782-789.
Thomas, J.J., 1992, Informal economic activity, LSE, Handbooks in Economics,
London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.18.04.00 C\Publ Choice Tagung-European\OECD SHAD EPCS Revised Version 31
Thomas, J.J., 1999, Quantifying the Black Economy: ‘Measurement without
Theory’ Yet Again?, The Economic Journal 109/456, pp.381-389.
Weck, H., 1983, Schattenwirtschaft: Eine Möglichkeit zur Einschränkung
der öffentlichen Verwaltung?, Bern: Verlag Peter Lang Publishing
Company.
Wagner, R. E., 1976, Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion and Budgetary Choice,
Public Choice, 25, pp. 45 - 61.